



RED GLOBALIZATION

*The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War
from Stalin to Khrushchev*

OSCAR SANCHEZ-SIBONY



CAMBRIDGE

RED GLOBALIZATION

Was the Soviet Union a superpower? *Red Globalization* is a significant rereading of the Cold War as an economic struggle shaped by the global economy. Oscar Sanchez-Sibony challenges the idea that the Soviet Union represented a parallel socioeconomic construct to the liberal world economy. Instead, he shows that the Soviet Union, a middle-income country more often than not at the mercy of global economic forces, tracked the same path as other countries in the world, moving from 1930s autarky to the globalizing processes of the postwar period. In examining the constraints and opportunities afforded the Soviets in their engagement of the capitalist world, he questions the very foundations of the Cold War narrative as a contest between superpowers in a bipolar world. Far from an economic force in the world, the Soviets managed only to become dependent providers of energy to the rich world, and second-best partners to the global South.

OSCAR SANCHEZ-SIBONY is Assistant Professor of World History at the University of Macau, China, where he teaches courses on Soviet history, the Cold War, and global capitalism.

NEW STUDIES IN EUROPEAN HISTORY

Edited by: Peter Baldwin, *University of California, Los Angeles*
Christopher Clark, *University of Cambridge*
James B. Collins, *Georgetown University*
MIA Rodríguez-Salgado, *London School of Economics and Political Science*
Lyndal Roper, *University of Oxford*
Timothy Snyder, *Yale University*

The aim of this series in early modern and modern European history is to publish outstanding works of research, addressed to important themes across a wide geographical range, from southern and central Europe, to Scandinavia and Russia, from the time of the Renaissance to the present. As it develops the series will comprise focused works of wide contextual range and intellectual ambition.

A full list of titles published in the series can be found at:
www.cambridge.org/newstudiesineuropeanhistory

RED GLOBALIZATION

*The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from
Stalin to Khrushchev*

OSCAR SANCHEZ-SIBONY



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org

Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781107040250

© Oscar Sanchez-Sibony 2014

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2014

Printed and bound in the United Kingdom by the MPG Books Group

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Sanchez-Sibony, Oscar, 1977-author.

Red globalization : the political economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev / Oscar Sanchez-Sibony.

pages ; cm. – (New studies in European history)

ISBN 978-1-107-04025-0 (Hardback)

1. Soviet Union–Foreign economic relations. 2. Foreign trade regulation–Soviet Union. 3. Cold War–Economic aspects–Soviet Union. 4. Soviet Union–Economic conditions–1945–1955. 5. Soviet Union–Economic conditions–1955–1965. I. Title. II. Series: New studies in European history.

HF3628.S26 2014

337.47009/045–dc23

2013035760

ISBN 978-1-107-04025-0 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

*This first book I've written is dedicated to my parents.
No sequence of sentences, no short narrative can explicate their presence
in this book.
Because I am him they made, this book is also theirs.*

Contents

<i>List of figures</i>	<i>page viii</i>
Introduction	I
PART I ISOLATION	
1 Depression Stalinism	25
2 Postwar: The Bretton Woods Cold War	57
PART II ASPIRATION	
3 Restoration: Resuming the relationship with Capitalism	91
4 Maelstrom: The decolonization vortex	125
PART III INTEGRATION	
5 Conformity and profit: The Soviet economy under American hegemony	173
6 Poor relations: The limits of Soviet economic dysfunction	204
Conclusion: Mikoyan's legacy	245
<i>Bibliography</i>	254
<i>Index</i>	269

Figures

Figure 1	Trade as percentage of national economy	<i>page</i> 5
Figure 1.1	NEP economic recovery (1913 = 100) Source: Dohan, 'Soviet Foreign Trade in the NEP,' 177	29
Figure 1.2	Russian and Soviet foreign trade in current prices, 1913, 1918–28 (million rubles) Source: <i>Vneshniaia trgovlia SSSR za 1918–1940 gg.</i> , 14.	34
Figure 1.3	Value of grain marketings (1913 = 100) Source: Davies, <i>From Tsarism to the New Economic Policy</i> , 279.	36
Figure 1.4	Volume of grain exports, 1913, 1922/23–1934 Source: Davies, Harrison and Wheatcroft, <i>The Economic Transformation of the Soviet Union</i> , 316. Calculated from <i>Vneshniaia trgovlia SSSR za 1918–1940 gg.</i> , 84, 110, 144, 179	36
Figure 1.5	Soviet foreign trade in current prices, 1927–35 (million rubles) Source: <i>Vneshniaia trgovlia SSSR za 1918–1940 gg.</i> , 14.	49
Figure 2.1	Foreign trade turnover by region (in millions of 1961 rubles) Source: Ministry of Foreign Trade, <i>Vneshniaia trgovlia SSSR. Statisticheskii obzor, 1918–1966</i> (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia," 1967), 62.	71
Figure 2.2	Soviet trade with the capitalist world, June 1949 to June 1950 Source: Calculated from RGASPI, f. 84, op. 1, d. 66, ll. 79–87.	78

- Figure 4.1 Utilized Soviet loans to India, 1951–1966 (in millions of rupees)
Source: Economic Survey 1966–67, Government of India 139
- Figure 4.2 Utilized Soviet grants to India, 1951–1966 (in millions of rupees)
Source: Economic Survey 1966–67, Government of India 139
- Figure 5.1 USSR trade with West Germany (in millions of current rubles)
Source: As derived from the *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za ... Statisticheskii obzor* series 190
- Figure 6.1 Regional weight of Soviet foreign trade, 1950
Source: From Ministerstvo vneshniaia torgovlia, *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1922–81. Iubileinyi statisticheskii obzor* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo financy i statistika, 1982), 26–27. 206
- Figure 6.2 Regional weight of Soviet foreign trade, 1960
Source: From Ministerstvo vneshniaia torgovlia, *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1922–81. Iubileinyi statisticheskii obzor* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo financy i statistika, 1982), 26–27. 206
- Figure 6.3 Regional weight of Soviet foreign trade, 1970
Source: From Ministerstvo vneshniaia torgovlia, *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1922–81. Iubileinyi statisticheskii obzor* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo financy i statistika, 1982), 26–27. 206
- Figure 6.4 Regional weight of Soviet foreign trade, 1980
Source: From Ministerstvo vneshniaia torgovlia, *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1922–81. Iubileinyi statisticheskii obzor* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo financy i statistika, 1982), 26–27. 207
- Figure 6.5 Soviet-Egyptian trade turnover (in millions of rubles)
Source: From Ministerstvo vneshniaia torgovlia, *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR, 1922–81. Iubileinyi statisticheskii obzor* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo financy i statistika, 1982), 26–27. 221
- Figure 6.6 Soviet cocoa imports from Ghana
Source: from Jacques Rolfo, “Optimal Hedging under

Price and Quantity Uncertainty: The Case of a Cocoa Producer,” *The Journal of Political Economy* 88:1 (1980): 100–16. Soviet volume and ruble imports, in 1961 rubles, are calculated from the *Vneshniaia torgovlia SSSR za . . . Statisticheskii obzor* series.

Acknowledgements

Thank you, Sheila. You were unimpressed with my first idea of what a book might look like, and limited yourself simply to reminding me of those interests that brought me to the University of Chicago in the first place and which I had put behind me during my immersion into the field. The fog lifted; you supported my next idea for a book. And when that one crumbled against the gates of the foreign ministry archives, you supported a new, impromptu book scheme. You showed confidence in my strengths and interests, and the dissertation, the first incarnation of this book, owed much to that blend of constancy and flexibility that has made you one of the field's great advisors. Later, while on a trip back to Moscow to temper the dissertation into a book, you pointed me to some excellent sources that have served this book well. The content of the book itself was perhaps somewhat outside of your usual Soviet stomping grounds, and for its wild assertions, combative tone (against your better judgment), and mistakes I alone must answer. But what use it might be to colleagues and general readers owes most to your guidance. Thank you.

To my fellow Chicago cohort, I owe you much as well. For years we discussed each other's work, at workshops and bars, while walking and eating. We did not always have the most enlightening things to tell of each other's work, but the continuous intellectual agitation the exchange itself created was the point, I think. Those conversations, on endless Soviet subjects, echoed in the recesses of my brain, finding outlet in arguments, expressions, and writing methods throughout this book. Surely my instincts are wrong when they try to take credit for the voice of the book. Perhaps more importantly, the example of your individual strengths was a thing to aspire to, and a constant motivation: the work ethic, the commitment to history and its Soviet experience, the archival expertise. Stacey Manley, Andrey Shlyakhter, Ken Roh, Michael Westren, Andy Janco, Ke-chin Hsia, Mie Nakachi, Ben Zajicek, Ed Cohn, Jennifer Amos, Alan Barenberg, Julia Fein, Rachel Applebaum, Julie Bashkin, Leah

Goldman, Flora Roberts, and Natalie Belsky, thank you for your companionship in Chicago. I am particularly thankful to have coincided in Chicago with one of its many talented students, one by the name of Slein. Andrew, not too long ago I rediscovered the very first email that you wrote me. It was a response to a draft of some chapter, perhaps the first one I wrote for the dissertation. I can't remember what I must have thought of your email then, probably that it was irrelevant and somewhat eccentric. I reread it more recently with increasing embarrassment in seeing so many of the underlying arguments I had struggled so painstakingly to construct in this book reflected – anticipated – so effortlessly in your email. I think this book has, in some subliminal manner, been chasing that vision, probably because it was given greater substance over the many beers and emails we later shared and exchanged.

In Chicago there were three somewhat more distant figures that nevertheless continue to shape my academic identity, and therefore this book. The late Richard Hellie was often inclined toward ideas I did not share, but he was a dedicated teacher. He was sometimes provocative, always gruff, and his praise was as reluctant as it was encouraging. He was unimpeachably collegial – a walking lesson on the matter – and one I will endeavor always to emulate. Ronald Suny rounded out the remarkable team in Chicago in Russian-Soviet history. Ron, your talent to size up an argument and leave it better than when you encountered it is a bit more difficult to emulate, but it has always been enlightening to behold at the Chicago workshop and in private consultations. It was an equal privilege to have had the advice of Bruce Cumings. Your touch was light, Bruce, and all the more convincing for it. What intellectual value this book carries derives in large part from an interaction with your ideas. These were not always easy to grasp, but rereading your prose was always a pleasure anyway. This book does not yet show that commitment to good writing that you preach and practice, but I am converted, and what scant literary pleasures might be found here owe to your example.

Bruce Cumings came, once upon a time, from the field of International Political Economy (IPE), a general approach to understanding power and international relations that is generally uncontroversial among political scientists but that the conservative field of Cold War history processed, impossibly, as Marxist “revisionism” and “economic determinism.” If Bruce planted the seeds, Omar, brother, you guided me through the IPE thicket that obtained. You read, reread, advised, and goaded. You critiqued, encouraged, and then advised some more. As did our sister Olivia's, your guidance started long ago, before the edge of memory, and

it continues. There would have been no impromptu plan for Sheila Fitzpatrick to support, nor a follow-through for her to believe in; this book might not have been but for you, or it might have been something else entirely, and certainly less interesting.

It's not only my own family, or Chicago, that has provided moral support and intellectual sustenance. Elizabeth McGuire provided both. At key moments of particular intellectual solitude, you appeared as if by magic to provide a readership of one that was as good as ten thousand, and a critical appraisal that was the essence of encouragement. Your latest act of magic came in the form of a dissertation review (for which I also thank the editors of the eponymous website) right as I was making the last push to finish the book. Thank you for that. Ben Loring, Brigid O'Keeffe, Ben Sawyer, Kelly Kolar, and others have continued the conversation on matters Soviet and otherwise well after the dissertation stage –sporadically to be sure, now that I am far – and theirs has been a reassuring continuity. Steve Maddox, Christian Teichmann, Josh Sanborn, Jesse Ferris, Arch Getty, Sean Guillory, Maya Haber, Greg Kveberg, Alex Oberlaender, Christoph Gumb, and the many others that gathered faithfully every Friday evening long ago in Moscow during the time I spent there doing the bulk of the research for this book, thank you for your companionship and conversation.

Institutions that have provided the critical money and infrastructure necessary for the book's production have been many. A Fulbright-Hayes fellowship and an unexpected IREX fellowship fronted the money for its initial dissertation form. I ended up with a product rather different than the one I sold these fine institutions, for which I always felt somewhat guilty, especially since the new topic, the one that is the subject of this book, never again found the enthusiastic backing of the one I aborted on Soviet-Cuban relations. Back in Chicago, a University of Chicago Trustees fellowship afforded me the time to write the bulk of the dissertation. The archivists at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), the Russian State Archive of the Economy (RGAE), and the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), as well as the librarians at the Lamont Library in Harvard, and June Farris at the University of Chicago library were invariably competent and helpful. And although no institution thought this subject matter worthy of further support, it did finally find its reward in the Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies (ASEEES) with the Tucker/Cohen Dissertation Prize; I will always be grateful to its 2010 committee, and especially its chair, Lewis Siegelbaum, for the morale boost that vote of confidence signified.

Later still, an early draft of the book was given a thorough mauling while in beautiful Poland. I thank Andrzej Kaminski and Jim Collins for the invitation to the conference on Recovering Forgotten History: The Image of East–Central Europe in Anglo-Saxon Textbooks, the people at Lazarski University for the impeccable organization and the lesson in hospitality, and Daria Nałęcz and Andrzej Nowak for taking time out of their busy schedules to read through the draft and critique it. A return trip to Moscow in 2011 introduced me to the helpful staff of the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI), to whom I am also much obliged. Money for that trip was provided by the always-generous University of Macau, where I must particularly thank Tim Simpson for his decisive help in unlocking the funds in time.

Kai, you never did like this book much, did you? By the time you even think of reading it, its ideas will be old. Whether useful or not, the book will be remembered, if at all, for the things it missed or got wrong altogether. Kai, the book kept me from you, as future ones will also do. They will keep me from your brother Luka too (not born as I write this, he will yet be older than this book). Kai, don't be mad. I must start on this journey, and this book is where the conversation starts. I don't know where this conversation will lead, Kai, but it forms now part of the effort to illuminate things that were dark, so you may walk in the world with more confidence. Your mother also wants you poised and wise. She has sacrificed more than anyone else in making this humble addition, and this is as much her project as it is mine, as many more will be. Kai, don't be mad. I hope one day you too will join the conversation. Its forms are many and varied, and you may choose your own. Until such a day, your mother and I will talk with you, and with your brother Luka, and also with the many thousands that we now journey with. Thank you, Yin, for that.

Introduction

Lorenzo traveled light. An exile from Spain living in Paris, and roughing it under bridges when money could not rent a bed, he was on a train heading east with a few shirts, an unwisely light jacket, rubber shoes his mother had sent from Spain and – his most precious possession – an article clipping from *Le Monde* in his pocket. It was early in 1963 and getting cold throughout Europe. Lorenzo was not yet twenty, and despite traveling as the representative of a Spanish Communist student organization (FUDE in its Spanish acronym), he was not quite a student either. It is true that he had received a very thorough education in the works of Karl Marx, but his educational institution had been one of Francisco Franco's correctional facilities for political hooligans. Lorenzo's lessons in Marxism had been carried out amidst discreet sessions of torture. He had entered jail an anti-Francoist, and had come out of it and gone into exile a committed Communist. Now he was heading past the Iron Curtain for a meeting in Warsaw of the International Union of Students, where he and hundreds of students from across Europe were to be welcomed by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Palace of Culture and Science, a magnificent eyesore recalling the old Warsaw Citadel that symbolized Russian rule over Poland a century earlier. Lorenzo's plan was to take out his *Le Monde* clipping at the meeting.

The Communist Bloc was a thorough disappointment for Lorenzo. Upon crossing the border into East Berlin, only recently ornamented with a long wall, he noticed a distinct surplus of machine guns hanging about the station. His Polish cabin companion, an aging teacher of French returning home, had become conspicuously taciturn after the crossing. Upon arriving in Warsaw, she addressed Lorenzo one last time to advise him not to change his French francs with the official money-changer on the train. "He is a thief," she spat, and Lorenzo could get four times the amount of zlotys in the street. Lorenzo thought her reactionary and bourgeois, but nevertheless changed only a small part of his meager wealth

on the train, only to find that in addition to being bourgeois and reactionary, his companion was also quite right.

At the dormitory in Warsaw, Lorenzo found a woman on duty surveilling every floor and she was not shy to irrupt into a room if any local female students happened to be socializing with the foreigners. Lorenzo found Communist Poland to have almost as many churches as Francoist Spain, and they were distinctly more popular here. If a New Man were to be born in these conditions, he would have the definite whiff of the traditional priggish man of God he knew so well back home, the same who taught in Catholic schools, thought education a bloody process, and took so many of Lorenzo's young classmates into rooms where no woman on duty would interrupt.

A warmer experience, perhaps one closer to the Communist Bloc of his imagination, might have mollified Lorenzo and kept him in line during the anticipated meeting with the Polish Foreign Minister. Instead he felt surer than ever. He must take out his article from *Le Monde*, his incontrovertible proof, and demand answers. What was written in the article? It was a simple story of trade. Poland had been selling coal to Spain throughout the year. Hard currency, as Lorenzo had already found out for himself, was much prized in the Communist Bloc after all. This seemed an innocuous item of information, and it was in fact a routine bit of profitable commercial exchange by this time, as far as Communist officials were concerned. But the actions of the Polish Communist Party also constituted an act of immense treachery against Lorenzo and his fellow exiled comrades.

The locus of anti-Francoist agitation in Spain was in the coal mines of the northern region of Asturias. In the spring of 1962, miners in that rugged land went on a massive strike, and the exiled Spanish Communists supported them in every possible way. This often meant clandestine trips back into Spain for the likes of young Lorenzo, a risky activity that could end up in capture or worse. In the event, the strikes of the unruly, courageous Asturians spread across the country and bowed the regime itself, inaugurating a new Spain in which workers had earned the right to organize and strike. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the coal strikes of 1962 sounded the death knell of the Spain Franco forged in the interwar era and became the year of inception of a social movement in Spain that culminated in the formation of a new European social democracy after Franco's death in 1975; and no thanks to the Polish Communist Party.

At the Palace of Culture and Science, Lorenzo waited until the end of the minister's speech to speak. With a knot in his throat but drawing

strength from his piece of newspaper, he was now waving it and demanding to know why the Polish Communists were undermining the single most important fight for socialism in Spain since it was extinguished there in 1939. The minister, taken aback by this unexpected turn, mumbled something about the friendship of the peoples and quickly changed the subject. The minister was right of course, and his comments were very much in line with the policy of the Kremlin and the whole of the Communist Bloc.

After this anticlimax, Lorenzo thawed in Paris and soon after quit the Communist party and returned to Spain, just barely avoiding the fate of many of his comrades who went on to fight against the right-wing dictatorships of Latin America only to be burned to a crisp by American napalm. Yet there was a curious convergence between the successive American administrations that murdered Lorenzo's friends in their jungle hideouts and Lorenzo himself, and it had to do with how both imagined the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc. For the US government, Lorenzo, and indeed most academic scholars, the Soviet Bloc was a world apart, an experiment being carried out behind high walls that intersected with the rest of the world mostly in the realm of ideas. As such, when acting beyond its borders, it was supposed to be relentlessly ideological, putting its messianic mission ahead of crass financial concerns; only political prerogatives concerning security and grand geopolitical games could trump ideological interests now and again. What the friends and enemies of Communism shared, then, was an imagined Communist Bloc that bore little relation to the actual policies, and indeed rhetoric, of Communist officials. Trade as a vehicle for world peace and a palliative for Cold War tensions appeared to Lorenzo – and was in fact – a terrible betrayal. This credo also sounded to Lorenzo, the US government, and generations of Western scholars as a cynical excuse, necessarily masking something more subversive.

This book argues that this was nothing of the sort. The Polish minister's excuse was, in fact, commercial policy of long standing in the Soviet Union and its post–World War II empire.¹ One of the most consistent areas of agreement among Westerners of all political stripes is a conception of the postwar international regime as strictly bipolar. This belief is an essential constituent of a Western European and North American narrative for

¹ Poland, alas, is not within the book's purview, although it can be assumed that their commercial policy was in keeping with that of the Soviets, and if anything, more aggressively integrationist with the liberal world order.

understanding themselves and the world around them; only such a distribution of global power could explain the very real division of Europe. Integral to this bipolarity framework is the idea that the Soviet Union was autarkic to its core. Autarky, often an unremarked condition but always foundational to any analysis of the Soviet Union, has allowed two sets of different but related scholarly artifice. On the one hand, autarky has enabled Sovietologists to construct a narrative of the country as an antagonistically illiberal and willful socio-political construction that could only be erected as a purely ideological undertaking: the “Soviet experiment.” The totalitarian paradigm that became so influential for understanding the Soviet Union in Western academia and societies at large was precisely built on those notions of autarky; only complete seclusion from the world could have deviated a country so far from the more organic liberal course that so often serves as the normative benchmark for historical development.² But on the left, autarky was also enthusiastically embraced; the idea of the Soviet Union as an experiment embodied the hope that processes were in motion there unsullied by the commercialized, exploitative capitalism of societies in the West. In the related field of Cold War studies, autarky served scholars in constructing a narrative that required a clear delineation of the two camps. The powers that be, above all the US Department of State, acted on this assumption and justified much of American foreign policy by it – often activating immense reserves of ignorance, racism, and cynicism to do so (see Guatemala circa 1954). There have not been many permutations of these assumptions in the Cold War scholarship; bipolarity is still the name of the game, and autarky its mostly unacknowledged foundation.

The problem is that Soviet autarky is wrong. It is wrong as a matter of statistical fact. It is wrong as a matter of clear and consistent political intent on the part of the Soviet leadership. It is wrong. Using domestic prices for foreign trade items – rather than the foreign prices converted to rubles at the exchange rate that the official foreign trade statistics use – the economist Vladimir Treml calculated that the share of foreign trade to

² A useful guide to totalitarianism as a conceptual framework is Abbot Gleason, *Totalitarianism. The Inner History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). The most recent iteration of this narrative is the modernity paradigm, which at least places the USSR within a larger pan-European narrative but sees it as a particularly nasty embodiment of Enlightenment logic precisely because it was so thoroughly illiberal, so thoroughly, willfully apart from the prevailing liberal order. The first and best statement in this line of inquiry is Stephen Kotkin, “Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjunction,” *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 2:1 (2001), III–64.




Figure 1 Trade as percentage of national economy

national income increased from 12 percent in 1960 to 21 percent in 1975 and about 27 percent in 1980 (see Figure 1). In other words, the Soviet Union had a level of “autarky” comparable to that of Japan, which followed a similar progression from the near autarky of the early 1950s to a more globalized economy two decades later.³

The Soviet Union throughout the postwar era was more sensitive to changes in the world economy than other large countries such as the United States, Brazil, India, and by the late 1970s, even Japan. But Trembl’s suggestive figures failed to percolate through the field; there was no place to integrate them within existing master narratives of the “Soviet experiment.” Likewise, the field largely ignored the four-decade-old work of Michael Dohan, which itself seemed to take its cue from the fast growth of Soviet economic relations through the 1960s and 70s.⁴ Dohan argued that autarky in the 1930s was not a political choice, but an outcome of the Great Depression. This book confirms and builds on his impeccable scholarship. The fact is that the Soviet economy was in large measure

³ Japan began the postwar Bretton Woods era in abject dependence to the United States, which accounts for the higher trade-to-GDP ratio early on. It ended the era less globalized than the USSR, whose trade-to-GDP ratio Trembl guessed would be above 30 percent in the 1980s, in Vladimir G. Trembl, “Soviet Dependence on Foreign Trade,” in NATO Economics Directorate, *External Economic Relations of CMEA Countries. Their Significance and Impact in Global Perspective*, Colloquium 1983 (Brussels: NATO, 1983), 35.

⁴ Michael R. Dohan, “Soviet Foreign Trade in the NEP Economy and Soviet Industrialization Strategy” (PhD diss., MIT, 1969).